Catégorie : BRICS

Building a Cameroon–Nigeria Axis for Structuring South–South Development

3rd juin 2025

A Strategic Proposal from the MLDC Based on the Community Developmental State (CDS)

Prof. Jimmy Yab. President of the MLDC. President of the Francophone China–Africa Observatory (OCAF). Professor of International Relations.

Prof Jimmy Yab & H.E. OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

Abstract

In a global context of shifting power poles, Cameroon remains deeply anchored in diplomatic frameworks inherited from colonialism, even as South–South dynamics are redrawing the paths of development. This article puts forward a strategic alternative led by the Mouvement pour la Libération et le Développement du Cameroun (MLDC): the creation of a structured bilateral cooperation axis between Cameroon and Nigeria, framed by the Community Developmental State (CDS) model. Drawing inspiration from Asian models of planned industrialization and pragmatic diplomacy, this partnership could accelerate regional integration, reinforce Cameroon’s economic sovereignty, and stabilize border zones through development-oriented diplomacy. The analysis draws upon recent economic data, academic references, and the author’s experience as president of the Francophone China–Africa Observatory (OCAF).

1. Introduction: The Urgency of Diplomatic Refoundation

A photo taken during the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) in Beijing—where the author was the sole representative of Cameroon, standing alongside President Olusegun Obasanjo—is more than symbolic. It illustrates a strategic vacuum in Cameroon’s diplomatic presence. While the world is restructuring around regional South–South alliances (Cheru & Obi, 2010), Cameroon remains absent from major co-development platforms, held captive by a France-centric diplomatic approach.

This diplomatic absence signals a structural crisis of vision, which the MLDC seeks to overcome through a developmental diplomacy rooted in the sub-region, positioning Nigeria as a first-tier strategic partner. Within this framework, the Community Developmental State offers the doctrinal and institutional basis to envision a new African regional order, led by sovereign and mutually supportive states.

2. Doctrinal Foundations: The Community Developmental State as a Lever for Regional Integration

Inspired by Asian models (Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam), the Community Developmental State advocated by the MLDC rests on three pillars of sovereignty: political, economic, and technological (Yab, 2024). It breaks away from paradigms of dependence on international donors in favor of national planning and regional integration.

As Leftwich (1995) emphasizes, development does not arise from automatic market liberalization, but from the strategic autonomy of a state embedded in its national and regional communities. The CDS reframes foreign action not as passive representation but as a public policy of structural transformation.

3. Nigeria: An Underutilized Power in Cameroon’s Regional Strategy

With a GDP of $477 billion (IMF, 2023), a population exceeding 230 million, vast gas reserves, and a growing manufacturing sector, Nigeria is the continent’s leading economic power. Yet, Cameroon has never developed a high-level bilateral cooperation framework with Abuja—despite sharing a 1,500 km border and informal trade flows estimated at over $500 million in 2022 (BEAC, 2023).

The MLDC proposes transforming this informal border coexistence into a structured co-development axis, built around logistical corridors (Garoua–Maiduguri, Bamenda–Enugu), joint economic zones, and industrial cooperation on regional value chains (livestock, textiles, agriculture, energy).

4. Academic and Operational Diplomacy: The Role of OCAF

As President of the Francophone China–Africa Observatory, the author has conducted numerous comparative analyses on Sino-African cooperation modalities. Contrary to simplistic interpretations, China does not impose a single model but offers a flexible negotiation framework in which the partner state remains responsible for its agenda (Brautigam, 2009).

It is this strategic school that informs our proposal: a co-diplomacy of development, in which Cameroon co-constructs with Nigeria:

A Cameroon–Nigeria Institute for South–South Development, based in Garoua or Maroua, to train regional cooperation personnel; Joint university programs linking Yaoundé I, Douala, Ibadan, Nsukka, Zaria, to share expertise in agriculture, health, security, and industry; A shared strategy to attract African and Asian FDI, particularly for financing common infrastructure.

5. Regional Security: Peace Through Integrated Development

The Cameroon–Nigeria border, particularly in the Far North, remains plagued by multiple forms of insecurity: Boko Haram, cross-border banditry, extreme poverty. The MLDC proposes a doctrine of developmental security, inspired by the concept of “human security” (UNDP, 1994), which integrates military action, social inclusion, and economic integration.

This doctrine is based on:

Joint community-based security forces, funded by both states; Economic stabilization projects in at-risk areas (roads, schools, hospitals); Regional reintegration centers for former combatants, linked to literacy and vocational training programs.

6. A Strategic Break from Passive Diplomacy

Unlike Cameroon’s current foreign policies, which rely on symbolic representation and influence, the MLDC’s approach is grounded in impact diplomacy, oriented toward sovereignty and development goals.

The proposed Cameroon–Nigeria axis adopts an offensive posture, based on a realistic reading of the regional environment. It aligns with the notion that well-crafted South–South alliances are now strategic levers comparable to past bilateral treaties with Northern powers (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2019).

Conclusion: Toward a Pan-African Developmental Geodiplomacy

The MLDC puts forward a true geopolitical shift for Cameroon. By reorienting Cameroonian diplomacy toward pragmatic South–South partnerships—beginning with Nigeria—it restores foreign policy to its historical mission: supporting national independence, accelerating development, and ensuring peace.

The Community Developmental State is not merely an administrative model but a strategic and operational framework for situating Cameroon within a strong, integrated, and sovereign Africa.

“Those not at the negotiation table are on the menu of history.”

— Prof. Jimmy Yab

References

Brautigam, D. (2009). The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press.

Cheru, F., & Obi, C. (2010). The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions. Zed Books.

Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton University Press.

IMF. (2023). World Economic Outlook. International Monetary Fund.

Leftwich, A. (1995). Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State. Journal of Development Studies, 31(3), 400–427.

Mohan, G., & Tan-Mullins, M. (2019). The Geopolitics of South–South Infrastructure Development: Chinese-Funded Transport Projects in Ethiopia and Kenya. Political Geography, 73, 31–43.

UNDP. (1994). Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. United Nations Development Programme.

Yab, J. (2024). Construction d’un État Développementaliste Communautaire : Le Cameroun. US Editions.

BEAC. (2023). Report on Informal Trade Flows in CEMAC. Bank of Central African States.

Que signifie la chute du régime d’Assad en Syrie pour les dictatures africaines et les régimes militaires de l’Alliance des États du Sahel soutenus par la Russie ?

9th décembre 2024

Résumé

La chute du régime syrien de Bachar al-Assad, survenue le 8 décembre, marque un tournant majeur dans la géopolitique régionale et mondiale. Précipitée par l’effondrement de son armée, le désengagement progressif de ses alliés historiques, et l’opportunisme des groupes islamistes, cet événement soulève des questions cruciales pour les régimes autoritaires en Afrique et les gouvernements militaires de l’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), soutenus par la Russie. Ce papier examine les implications de cette évolution sur la stabilité politique et les alliances stratégiques dans ces régions.

Mots-clés : Chute d’Assad, Russie, dictatures africaines, Alliance des États du Sahel, géopolitique, influence russe, Korybko (2016), Boniface (2024).

Abstract

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime on December 8, driven by the weakening of its army, the disengagement of its historical allies, and Islamist opportunism, represents a major geopolitical shift. This event raises critical questions for African authoritarian regimes and military governments in the Sahel Alliance, both heavily reliant on Russian support. This paper explores the implications of this development on political stability and strategic alliances in these regions.

Keywords: Assad’s fall, Russia, African dictatorships, Sahel Alliance, geopolitics, Russian influence, Korybko (2016), Boniface (2024).

Introduction

Le 8 décembre marque un moment décisif dans l’histoire moderne du Moyen-Orient avec la chute du régime syrien de Bachar al-Assad. Cet effondrement, attribué à une combinaison de facteurs internes et externes, dont l’affaiblissement de l’armée syrienne, le désengagement de ses soutiens comme la Russie et l’Iran, ainsi que l’offensive opportuniste des groupes islamistes, remet en cause des équilibres géopolitiques. Ce bouleversement a des implications directes pour les régimes autoritaires africains et les gouvernements militaires sahéliens, en particulier ceux liés à la Russie.

1. Les facteurs de la chute d’Assad et leurs implications

1.1. L’affaiblissement de l’armée syrienne

La désintégration de l’armée syrienne sous la pression des groupes islamistes a démontré l’incapacité des régimes autoritaires à résister à des crises prolongées sans un soutien militaire solide. Cela met en lumière la dépendance excessive des régimes comme ceux du Sahel vis-à-vis de partenaires étrangers comme la Russie.

• Impact potentiel : Les régimes sahéliens, confrontés à des insurrections similaires, pourraient tirer des leçons de cet échec militaire, mais aussi voir leurs propres armées questionnées sur leur résilience.

1.2. Le désengagement des soutiens historiques

La préoccupation croissante de la Russie et de l’Iran sur d’autres théâtres stratégiques (Ukraine, tensions dans le Golfe) a accéléré la chute d’Assad. Comme le souligne Boniface (2024), une puissance étrangère incapable de maintenir ses alliances fragilise les régimes qui dépendent de son soutien.

• Exemple africain : Une Russie affaiblie par la guerre en Ukraine pourrait se désengager de ses partenariats militaires avec l’AES, mettant en péril les régimes militaires du Sahel.

1.3. L’opportunisme des groupes islamistes

L’offensive des groupes islamistes en Syrie illustre l’importance de leur capacité à exploiter les failles des régimes autoritaires. Selon Dia (2013), cette dynamique se retrouve au Sahel, où des groupes comme AQMI et Boko Haram utilisent les faiblesses institutionnelles pour renforcer leur influence.

• Risque au Sahel : Les gouvernements militaires sahéliens pourraient être confrontés à une intensification des attaques terroristes en cas de fragilisation de leur soutien extérieur.

2. La fragilité des alliances russes en Afrique

La chute d’Assad met en lumière la dépendance des régimes autoritaires envers la Russie. Selon Korybko (2016), les alliances russes reposent sur des partenariats transactionnels limités à des livraisons d’armes et de mercenaires. La perte du régime syrien expose les limites de cette stratégie.

• Implications pour l’AES : Les régimes militaires du Sahel, comme ceux du Mali et du Burkina Faso, pourraient être confrontés à une diminution des livraisons d’armes et d’un soutien logistique crucial.

3. Répercussions politiques et sociales

3.1. Effet de contagion politique

La chute d’un régime soutenu par la Russie envoie un signal fort aux mouvements d’opposition dans des pays comme le Tchad ou la Guinée, renforçant leur détermination à défier les gouvernements en place. Boniface (2024) souligne que de telles transitions politiques s’accélèrent souvent après la chute de régimes soutenus par des puissances majeures.

3.2. Instabilité sécuritaire

Le désengagement russe affaiblirait les capacités militaires des régimes sahéliens, augmentant leur vulnérabilité aux groupes terroristes. Dia (2013) note que les acteurs non étatiques exploitent souvent ces moments de transition pour renforcer leur contrôle territorial.

4. Scénarios futurs pour l’Afrique et le Sahel

4.1. Reconfiguration des alliances

Les régimes militaires du Sahel pourraient chercher de nouveaux partenaires stratégiques comme la Turquie ou la Chine pour compenser le retrait potentiel de la Russie.

4.2. Transitions démocratiques

L’absence de soutien extérieur pourrait accélérer des transitions démocratiques forcées sous la pression des populations locales et des acteurs internationaux.

4.3. Aggravation des crises humanitaires

La fragilisation des régimes sahéliens exacerberait les crises existantes, notamment en matière de sécurité alimentaire, de déplacements de populations et de manque d’accès aux services de base.

Conclusion

La chute du régime d’Assad, résultat de facteurs internes et externes, représente un avertissement pour les dictatures africaines et les régimes militaires sahéliens. Elle souligne les limites de la stratégie russe de maintien des régimes autoritaires et met en lumière la fragilité des alliances stratégiques en Afrique. À mesure que la Russie réévalue ses priorités internationales, l’instabilité dans les zones sous son influence pourrait s’intensifier, ouvrant la voie à une refonte des équilibres régionaux et à une éventuelle démocratisation.

Références

1. Korybko, A. (2016). “La Russie au Moyen-Orient : Leçons pour l’Afrique.” Mondialisation.ca.

2. Boniface, P. (2024). La géopolitique : 50 fiches pour comprendre l’actualité.

3. Dia, A.M. (2013). Ruptures diplomatiques et sécurité internationale.

Review of SELE YALAGHULI’s article, « South Africa and BRICS: Assessing the Flying Geese Strategy as a Re-Distributional Mechanism for Inclusive Economic Gains » by Jimmy Yab

4th décembre 2024
Minister Sele YALAGHULI & Pr Jimmy YAB

Introduction

Sele Yalaghuli’s article, South Africa and BRICS: Assessing the Flying Geese Strategy as a Re-Distributional Mechanism for Inclusive Economic Gains, provides a compelling analysis of South Africa’s role within the BRICS economic bloc. The author employs the Flying Geese model to explore industrial redistribution strategies that could enable South Africa to address its pressing socioeconomic challenges. This review examines the article’s theoretical contributions, empirical insights, and policy recommendations while suggesting areas for further exploration.

Theoretical Contributions

Application of the Flying Geese Model

The adaptation of the Flying Geese model, a concept rooted in East Asia’s economic rise, to the BRICS context is one of the article’s key theoretical innovations. Initially formulated by Akamatsu (1937), the model explains how industrial advancements cascade from lead economies to less developed ones in a V-formation. Yalaghuli’s application of this framework to South Africa’s industrial development is both innovative and timely, as it extends the model’s relevance beyond its traditional Asian focus (Kumagai, 2008; Kojima, 2000). By identifying China as the “lead goose,” the article highlights how South Africa could leverage its BRICS membership to develop industries like textiles that are being relinquished by China due to rising production costs and demographic shifts.

The integration of the Cobb-Douglas production function to assess the relationship between input factors and output among BRICS members further enriches the theoretical discourse. This mathematical underpinning demonstrates the economic efficiency of reallocating industrial activities, as shown in studies of other latecomer economies (Yang & Cao, 2023).

Geopolitical Framing

The article situates the Flying Geese model within the broader geopolitical aspirations of BRICS. Yalaghuli argues that equitable economic development within the bloc is critical for challenging Western hegemony, echoing the themes of South-South cooperation articulated by Duggan et al. (2022) and Chatterjee & Naka (2022). This geopolitical lens strengthens the model’s applicability to BRICS, where economic redistribution is not only about growth but also about fostering unity against unipolar dominance.

Empirical Insights

Comparative GDP and Export Analysis

Yalaghuli’s comparative analysis of GDP compositions and export patterns from 2010 to 2022 provides a robust empirical foundation for the study. The data highlights significant disparities between South Africa and its BRICS counterparts, particularly in industrial output and export composition. For example, South Africa’s reliance on raw material exports, such as coal and iron ore, contrasts sharply with China’s dominance in capital goods exports (Statista, 2023). This disparity underscores the structural challenges South Africa faces in aligning with the manufacturing-led growth seen in other BRICS nations (Kundu, 2014).

The earmarking of textiles as a focus industry is particularly insightful. The study reveals that textile manufacturing is already shifting from China to economies like Ethiopia, driven by lower labor costs (Ruan & Zhang, 2014). This trend aligns with the Flying Geese model’s prediction of industrial migration and offers a practical pathway for South Africa to revitalize its manufacturing sector. However, as Yalaghuli notes, South Africa’s success in this area will depend on addressing domestic constraints, including energy instability and high unemployment.

Socioeconomic Challenges

The article’s discussion of South Africa’s socioeconomic challenges is compelling. With 59.4% youth unemployment and a Gini coefficient of 0.65, South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies globally (Statistics South Africa, 2024). These statistics are crucial in contextualizing the urgency of industrial development. By linking these challenges to South Africa’s underperformance within BRICS, Yalaghuli strengthens the argument for adopting redistributional mechanisms like the Flying Geese strategy.

Policy Recommendations

Textile Manufacturing Pact

One of the most actionable recommendations in the article is the proposal for a textile manufacturing pact between South Africa and China. This pact would not only create jobs but also help South Africa develop a competitive manufacturing base. The author’s suggestion that South Africa leverage its youthful labor force to absorb labor-intensive industries aligns with the experiences of other latecomer economies, such as Vietnam and Bangladesh (Xu & Cao, 2019).

However, the article could further explore the political and economic feasibility of such a pact. For instance, would China’s willingness to share market space extend to significant technology transfers, or would South Africa need to negotiate these separately? Additionally, the potential environmental impacts of expanding textile manufacturing warrant consideration, given the global push for sustainable industrial practices (Brautigam et al., 2018).

Energy Infrastructure

While the article identifies energy instability as a major barrier, it does not delve deeply into potential solutions. Addressing South Africa’s energy crisis is essential for any industrial strategy to succeed. Yalaghuli could enhance this discussion by examining how renewable energy investments or partnerships within BRICS might alleviate these constraints (Vayez, 2023).

Areas for Further Exploration

Quantitative Projections

While the article provides a strong qualitative analysis, additional quantitative projections could strengthen its policy recommendations. For instance, modeling the impact of a textile pact on South Africa’s GDP and employment rates over the next decade would offer a clearer picture of the strategy’s potential benefits (Nagar, 2023).

Broader Sectoral Applications

Expanding the analysis to other sectors, such as automotive or renewable energy, could provide a more comprehensive view of South Africa’s industrial potential. These sectors align with global trends and could offer additional avenues for collaboration within BRICS (Palma, 2009).

Conclusion

Sele Yalaghuli’s article is a significant contribution to the discourse on BRICS and its potential as a platform for inclusive economic development. By applying the Flying Geese model to South Africa’s context, the study bridges theoretical innovation with practical policy recommendations. Its emphasis on equitable redistribution within BRICS is both timely and necessary for fostering unity in the Global South. However, future research should incorporate quantitative projections, address energy infrastructure challenges, and explore additional sectors to enhance the analysis further.

Bibliography

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  2. Brautigam, D., Xiaoyang, T., & Xia, Y. (2018). « What kinds of Chinese ‘Geese’ are flying to Africa? Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms. » CARI Working Policy No. 17.
  3. Chatterjee, M., & Naka, I. (2022). « Twenty years of BRICS: Political and economic transformations through the lens of land. » Oxford Development Studies, 50, 2-13.
  4. Duggan, N., Hooijmaaijers, B., & Rewizorski, M. (2022). « The BRICS, Global Governance, and Challenges for South-South Cooperation in a Post-Western World. » International Political Science Review, 43, 469-480.
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  6. Nagar, M. (2023). « South Africa is failing to live up to its constitution. » The Conversation, July 27.
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  8. Ruan, J., & Zhang, X. (2014). « Flying Geese in China: The textile and apparel industry’s pattern of migration. » Journal of Asian Economics, 34, 79-91.
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  10. Vayez, A. (2023). « Evolving Multilateralism: BRICS, the EU, and Responses to the Russian-Ukraine Conflict. » Africa Policy Research Institute.